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Medical and Legal Aspects of Human
Organ Transplantation
Carl E. Wasmuth* and Bruce H. Stewart**
F OR CENTURIES man has been intrigued by the concept of trans-
planting body parts from a healthy individual into another
person whose parts have been destroyed by disease or injury.
Early legends of the middle ages describe the miraculous trans-
fer of extremities and facial structures of slaves or benevolent
donors to persons suffering from loss of such parts. Although the
credibility of such tales runs counter to modern scientific knowl-
edge, the idea has fascinated medical scientists ever since.
Medical Aspects of Transplants
With the development of more precise surgical techniques in
the 19th and early 20th centuries, further attempts were made to
transplant skin, teeth, bone, corneas, and other structures from
one individual to another.' - 6 It was gradually learned that the
body regards such transplanted tissues as foreign, and usually
tries to reject them soon after transplantation. 7 The greater the
genetic difference between donor and recipient, the more rapid
and vigorous the rejection reaction becomes.8 Thus it was found
* M.D., LL.B., F.C.L.M., of Cleveland Clinic Foundation; Assoc. Prof., Cleve-
land-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
** M.D., of Cleveland-Clinic Foundation.
[A paper presented at the annual meeting of the American College of Legal
Medicine in New York City on June 20, 1965]
I Baronio, Degli Innesti Animali (Milan, 1804). First skin autograft reported.
2 Schone, Vergleichende Untersuchungen ueber die Transplantation von
Geschwelsten und von normalen Geweben. Burns, 61 Beitr. Klin. Chir. 1
(1908). During 19th Century skin grafts taken without distinction between
autograft and homograft.
3 Hunter, Natural History of Human Teeth (London, 1771).
4 Mercer, Orthopedic Surgery 49-50 (6th Ed. 1964).
5 Sellerbeck, Concerning Keratoplasty. 24 Arch. f. Ophth. Abt. IV 1-46
(1878).
6 Zirm, On Corneal Transplantation. 20 Wien. Klin. Wochnschr. 61-65
7 Lexer, Ueber Freie Transplantationen. 95 Arch. Klin. Chir. 827 (1911).
First stated that homotransplantation was not successful whereas auto-
transplantation was.
s Medawar, The Immunology of Transplantation. Series 52 The Harvery
Lectures 144 (1956-1957).
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that animal to human transplants (heterotransplantation) were
virtually never successful. Procedures involving unrelated hu-
man donors (homotransplantation) were occasionally successful.
Procedures in which the graft was taken from a twin (isotrans-
plantation) or from the patient himself (autotransplantation)
were almost universally successful unless technical problems
developed.
As this problem of rejection became recognized, transplan-
tation in humans fell into virtual disuse during most of the first
half of the 19th century. Skin and bone, when needed, were usu-
ally obtained from other areas of the patient himself. Only in the
area of corneal transplantation, where the rejection reaction is
virtually non-existent, were further techniques of homotrans-
plantation actively developed.9 From a practical standpoint the
eyes could be rather easily obtained as part of a sterile autopsy,
trained ophthalmologists assisting the pathologist after special
permission had been obtained from the next of kin. Since sev-
eral hours may elapse between death and removal and storage
of the eyes without reducing the chances of successful trans-
plantation, there have been very few legal problems in this field.
In 1954 a new chapter in the field of organ transplantation
was written, when at the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston
a healthy kidney from one twin was successfully transplanted
into the other twin who was dying of kidney failure.' 0 This was
made possible in part by the early work of Carrel," who de-
scribed a kidney transplantation technique in animals but found
early rejection an insurmountable problem in non-twin experi-
ments, and by the development of an artificial kidney by Kolif
and others which enabled patients dying of kidney failure to be
temporarily rehabilitated and properly prepared for opera-
tion. 12- 14 Identical twin transplantation has subsequently been
9 Paton, Corneal Transplantation: A Historical Review. 33 Am. J. Ophthal.
3-5 (1950).
10 Merrill, Murray, Harrison, and Guild, Successful Homotransplantation of
the Human Kidney Between Identical Twins, 160 J.A.M.A. 277 (1956).
11 Carrel, The Ultimate Result of a Double Nephrectomy and the Replanta-
tion of one Kidney. 14 J. Exp. Med. 124 (1911).
12 Kolif and Berk, Artificial Kidney, Dialyzer with Great Area, 21
Geneesk. Gids. (1944).
13 Scribner, Caner, Buri, and Quinton, 6 Trans. Amer. Soc. Artif. Intern.
Organs 88 (1960).
14 Kolif, Nakamot, and Scudder, Experiences With Longterm Intermittent
Dialyses, 8 Trans. Amer. Soc. Artif. Intern. Organs. 292-295 (1962).
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repeated in at least 36 instances, and most of these have been
successful since rejection is not a problem in this situation.
Because very few patients with kidney failure possess an
identical twin capable of donating a kidney, however, other
methods have been sought by which the rejection reaction can
be reduced or modified, enabling kidneys from non-twin donors
to survive.1 5 The development of specific anti-rejection drugs
during the past few years has made this at least in part possible.
Initially, most kidneys were donated by blood relatives, since
genetically the closer the donor is to the recipient, the better the
chances are for the survival of the homograft. By early 1964
some 232 kidney transplantation procedures had been done
throughout the world utilizing healthy blood relative donors,
with 123 of the recipients surviving with functioning kidneys.
Kidneys were also obtained from living unrelated volunteer do-
nors in other instances where a suitable related donor was not
available.'
It also became evident, moreover, that there were many
more patients dying of kidney failure than there were available
living human donors. Efforts were then directed toward obtain-
ing kidneys from patients dying suddenly of other disease-so
called cadaver donors. This had been attempted 142 times with
36 survivors as of early 1964.10 Although recent work has indi-
cated increasing success in this type of homotransplantation,'17
which has the obvious advantage of sparing a living person the
hazards and discomforts of kidney donation, the logistics of ob-
taining and using such kidneys can be formidable. Unlike skin,
bone, blood vessels and corneas, which can be obtained at au-
topsy and successfully used many hours after death, the kidneys
deteriorate very rapidly and must be obtained soon after cessa-
tion of circulation in the donor in order to survive and function.
Because the logistics of obtaining cadaver kidneys are rather
complex, and because multiple legal problems may arise during
the course of such procedures, the actual method of transplan-
tation will be here discussed in some detail.
15 Converse and Rogers, Symposia of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th International
Tissue Homotransplantation Research Conferences. 73 N. Y. Acad. Sc. 538
(1958); 87 id. 1 (1960); 99 id. 335 (1962).
16 Murray, et al., Second Report of Registry in Human Kidney Transplan-
tation, 2 Transplantation 660-664 (1964).
17 Stewart et al., Renal Homotransplantation with Cadaver Donors, 19
Urology Digest 32 (1965).
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Patients who are dying of kidney failure and who are poten-
tial recipients of cadaver kidneys are maintained in relatively
good health by intermittent treatment with the artificial kidney.
Each treatment lasts for 10 or 12 hours, and most patients re-
quire at least two treatments per week. They can usually leave
the hospital after the first few treatments and live nearby until
a donor kidney becomes available. When the availability of a
donor kidney is imminent, the patients are alerted and rushed to
the hospital where preparations for emergency operation are be-
ing made.
The source of kidneys for cadaver transplantation is usually
from patients in the hospital who die suddenly from unrelated
causes. Sudden severe brain damage as seen with massive hem-
orrhage or head injury, or irreversible cardiac arrest which can
result from a severe heart attack or from complicated heart sur-
gery are the commonest situations in which cadaver donor kid-
neys can be salvaged. Such patients can usually be supported
by cardiac massage and/or artificial respiration until it is ob-
vious the situation is hopeless and death inevitable. At this point
the attending physician appraises the family of the situation and
asks permission to obtain the kidneys for transplantation at time
of death. If permission is granted by signing a special form,
emergency preparation is then made for transplantation. Trans-
plant teams are alerted, and as soon as the attending physician
pronounces death the patient is rushed to the operating room
where under sterile conditions the kidneys are removed by a
surgical team. As soon as they are removed, the kidneys are per-
fused with a special nutrient solution and stored in oxygen until
the recipient can be readied by a second operating team. If both
kidneys are suitable, two recipients can be prepared simulta-
neously by separate operating teams and dual transplantation
carried out. While transplantation is going on, the first surgical
team closes the incision in the donor in the same manner as for
an ordinary abdominal operation and the donor is then trans-
ferred to the Department of Pathology where autopsy or prep-
aration for burial is carried out in the usual fashion. It has been
found that if the kidneys can be removed and perfused in less
than one hour after cessation of circulation in the donor, the
chances for survival are good. As further time elapses the
chances diminish, so that beyond two hours it is very unlikely
that transplantation will be successful.
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As work in this field progresses, it is becoming more and
more obvious that the supply of cadaver donor kidneys as cur-
rently obtained cannot keep pace with the number of patients
who are dying of kidney disease and who might benefit from a
kidney transplant. Attempts are being made to obtain such kid-
neys from homicide victims or sudden accidental deaths, but
legal difficulties in this area have made progress slow to date.
Similar principles apply in the field of heart, lung and liver
transplantation which is still in the developmental stage and has
not been successfully applied to humans as yet.8 - °20 In future
transplantation of these organs it is obvious that cadavers will be
the only donor source unless suitable animal donors can be
found, which seems highly unlikely at this time. With all cadaver
transplantation procedures it is vitally important to maintain
circulation in the donor up to a time as close as possible to actual
removal of the organ. This means that the obtaining of healthy
organs from recently deceased patients for use in transplantation
constitutes a surgical emergency, where minutes count in terms
of survival of the organ and recovery of the recipient. The spe-
cific rights of the various donors, live or cadaver, as well as those
of the potential recipients have not yet been fully clarified from
a legal standpoint. We are faced with the problem then, that the
law is not keeping pace with scientific advancement in this field,
and medical progress may therefore be held back until satisfac-
tory legal clarification develops.
Legal Problem
Problems due to lack of proper legal machinery have not
caused serious difficulty where live human donors are involved.
Careful explanation of the risks of such procedures by the med-
ical staff, with properly witnessed signature of a special living
donor consent form (See Figure 1), has proven satisfactory to
date. In the case where the donor may be a minor, as happened
in the early identical twin transplants in Boston, the court has
been petitioned for declaratory judgment regarding desirability
and legality of the procedure.
18 Hardy, et al., Heart Transplantation in Man. 188 J. A. M. A. 1132-1140
(1964).
19 Titus, Shorter, & Payne, Transplantation of the Lung. 48 Med. Clin.
N. Am. 1089-1095 (1964).
20 Starzyl, et al., Immunosuppression After Experimental and Clinical
Homotransplantation of the Liver. 160 Ann. Surg. 411 (1964).
Sept., 1965
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On the other hand, when an organ from a cadaver donor is
to be transplanted to a living recipient, several complex legal
problems confront the surgeon. 21 Particularly in the group of
transplantation operations that have been termed "emergency,"
time is of the essence. Of interest particularly are those organs
that, if removed for donation, doom the donor to certain death.
Living donors would seem to be a rather limited source of such
tissue to be used for therapeutic purposes. For the most part,
the surgeon must look elsewhere than to living donors for organs
to transplant into the recipient. Accordingly, therefore, if any
great amount of tissue is to become available for homografts, it
must come from the bodies of deceased individuals.22 The organs
such as kidneys and liver must be removed from the cadaver-
donor as soon after death as possible-not within days or even
hours but within minutes. At death, the discontinuation of cir-
culation of blood to some organs whose oxygen demands are ex-
tremely high causes irreversible damage. The question now
arises: What legal instruments must be secured? In preparation
for the immediate use of valuable tissue, who may give consent
to remove organs from a person whose death is known to be im-
minent?
Consideration of the use of cadaver organs brings forth a
host of legal complexities dealing with the various rights of the
deceased as well as of the survivors. Probably the simplest and
the most expeditious manner of providing an organ or organs of
a person's body to be used in transplantation procedures to
others would be statutory authority for a living authorized per-
son to grant permission to remove such organs immediately after
death. Then the only question remaining is the definition of
death-what constitutes death, and when does it occur?
A living person has, as a general rule, only limited powers to
dispose of his body or the parts of his body after his death unless
it is specifically provided for by statutes. It might be possible
for a person to donate a part of his body while living-for in-
stance when an individual elects to donate a pint of blood or one
of his kidneys. (See Consent Form-Figure 2.) It is doubtful
that the same person would willingly donate a vital organ with-
21 Louisville and Nashville R. R. v. Wilson, 123 Ga. 62, 51 S. E. 24 (1905).
22 159 J. A. M. A. 487 (1955); 271 New England J. Med. 691 (1964).
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out which life in him would be precluded.2 3 The question of vital
organ transplantation seldom arises until the prospective donor
himself is acutely ill. It would be a most shocking experience to
a desperately ill patient to be consulted relative to the donation
of any of his vital organs at a time when he is desperately trying
to remain alive. Moreover, there may be a serious doubt as the
physiologic capacity of this individual to grant such permission.
Therefore, permission for organ donation must be obtained not
from the patient but from the relatives at or near the actual time
of death.
Certain of our States permit an individual to dispose of his
body after death by will.24 In California, the decedent before his
death may direct the disposition of his remains. This provision
of the will is valid regardless of the validity of the will in other
respects.
A decedent prior to his death, may direct the preparations
for, type or place of interment of his remains, either by oral
or written instructions. If such instructions are in a will or
other written instrument, he may direct that the whole or
any part of his remains be given to a teaching institution,
university, college, legally licensed hospital, or to the state
director of public health and the person or persons other-
wise entitled to control the disposition of such remains under
the provisions of this section shall faithfully carry out the
directions of the decedent subject only to the provisions of
this chapter with respect to the duties of the coroner.
If such instructions are contained in a will, they shall be im-
mediately carried out, regardless of the validity of the will
in other respects or of the fact that the will may not be
offered for or admitted to be probated until a later date.
This section shall be administered and construed to the end
that such expressed instructions of any person shall be faith-
fully and promptly performed.25
Likewise in another State, the legislature has provided that after
the death of a person, his body may be disposed of as provided
in a will or by an instrument executed in the same manner as a
deed. The only qualification is that the body must be used for
scientific purposes. In fact, it specifically states ". . . for other
advancement of medical science, or for the replacement or re-
habilitation of diseased or worn out parts or organs of other hu-
23 159 J. A. M. A. 487 (1955).
24 California Health and Safety Code, sec. 7100.
25 Ibid.
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mans." 26 Thus, there is authority in some States that recognize
the right of a person to provide by will for the disposition of his
own body after death. However, there is serious question wheth-
er the testamentary provision, of its own force, will overcome an
objection of the testator's spouse or close relative.2 7
The right of a person to provide by will for the disposition
of his own body after death seems to have been generally
recognized. However, a person may not by will order the
disposition of his body to be in accordance with the wishes
of a nonrelative as against the wishes of his widow. By the
canon law a person had a right to direct his place of sepul-
ture. A person's expressed wish or direction as to the dis-
posal of his body after death is entitled to respectful consid-
eration by the court and should be carried out as far as pos-
sible. How far the desires of a decedent as to his method of
burial should prevail against those of surviving husband or
wife is an open question, but as against remoter kindred
such wishes, especially if strongly and recently expressed,
should usually prevail.
Most States, however, do not provide for the testamentary
disposition of the body of the deceased. According to the law of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, any directive for the dis-
position of the human body or its parts, signed by the decedent,
is not binding on the next of kin. The consignment of the body
to science for anatomic dissection, post-mortem examination, or
tissue transplantation can be denied by the next of kin.2 8
While the acquisition of organs for transplantation into a
recipient at first blush seems to be easily solved by passage of
appropriate legislation (whereby a person may donate his body
for organ transplantation) the problem is really not so easily
solved. Its success would depend wholly upon the education of
the public in this regard. Unfortunately, such a program would
take considerable time and effort. At present, the need for organs
for transplantation is becoming increasingly urgent because of
recent scientific advances which are outdistancing the limitations
of the law.
In jurisdictions where there is no provision for antemortem
disposition of the decedent's body, it becomes necessary to exam-
26 159 J. A. M. A. 487 (1955).
27 15 Am. Jur. 836 (1938).
28 271 New England J. Med. 691 (1964), 42 Ill. L. Rev. 393, 394 (1947); 15
Am. Jur. 838 (1938); 159 J. A. M. A. 487 (1955).
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ine the common law. It is axiomatic that the care and disposition
of dead bodies have such a relation to the public health that they
may be regulated by law. There is no question that the legisla-
ture through its police power may exercise complete control of
burials so far as is necessary for the protection of the public
health and the promotion of the public safety.
In the early and barbaric times bodies were left unprotected
where they died. Later the manner of disposal varied in
different communities, and the bodies were buried in the
ground, exposed to beasts of prey, thrown into the river or
sea, or gathered up without regard to condition or sex and
thrown together in a pit. But generally in modern civilized
countries, both sanitary and sentimental considerations de-
mand a more effective, decent, and orderly disposition of
dead bodies. Even when death occurs on the ocean and the
body must be disposed of there, its consignment to the waves,
so far as is practical, is respectful and solemn. To burn a
body instead of burying it is not a criminal offense, unless
done to prevent an inquest. Cremation is common and its
propriety seems seldom, if ever, to have been questioned.
In fact the law does not seem to require any particular mode
or manner of disposing of dead bodies, providing the dispo-
sition is sanitary and decent.29
Common Law
In the early common law of England, there were no rights
in the body of a deceased person. The rights that did exist were
divided between the common law courts and the ecclesiastic
courts. Blackstone, in his commentaries on the Laws of England,
stated:
* * * But though the heir has a property in the monuments
and escutcheons of his ancestors, yet he has none in their
bodies or ashes; nor can he bring any civil action against
such as indecently at least, if not impiously, violate and dis-
turb their remains when dead and buried. The parson, in-
deed, who has the freehold of the soil, may bring an action
of trespass against such as dig and disturb it; and if anyone
in taking up a dead body steals the shroud or other apparel,
it will be felony; for the property thereof remains in the
executor, or whoever was at the charge of the funeral.30
29 15 Am. Jur. 838 (1938).
30 "It has been determined, that stealing dead bodies, though for the im-
provement of the science of anatomy, is an indictable offence as a misde-
(Continued on next page)
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It is apparent that the ecclesiastic courts exercised jurisdic-
tion over the affairs of the decedent involving burial. For in-
stance, no mode of burial could be permitted which would pro-
long the natural decay of the body or needlessly preserve its
identity. The dead, it was held, ".. . have no legal right to crowd
the living, each buried generation must give way to its successor,
and at that, therefore, an iron coffin, which would unduly and un-
lawfully prolong the period of identifying the remains, was eccle-
siastically inadmissible unless an extra fee was paid to the
church." 31
If the body lay in consecrated ground, the ecclesiastic law
would interpose its protection. However, in later English cases,
we find that the common law courts exercised jurisdiction over
the dead body by stating that ". . . a dead body by law belongs
to no one, and is, therefore, under the protection of the public." 32
The common law of England recognized the public interest in
(Continued from preceding page)
meanour; it being a practice contrary to common decency, and shocking to
the general sentiments and feelings of mankind.
"Though a philosopher may be regardless of his own body after death,
yet he must be destitute of the feelings of humanity, if he could bear with-
out concern that the body of a beloved wife, daughter, or sister, had been
exposed to public view, and mangled by the dissector's knife.
"The principle is well described by Cicero; de humatione unum tenen-
dum est, contemnendan in nobis, non negligendam in nostris; ita tamen
mortuorum corpora nibil sentire intelligamus. Quantum autem consuetudini
famaeque dandum sit, id curent vivi."
See also, 3 Coke Inst. 203.
"The doctrine that a corpse is not property seems to have had its origin
in the dictum of Lord Coke (3 Co. Inst. 203), where, in asserting the au-
thority of the church, he says: 'It is to be observed that in every sepulchre
that hath a monument two things are to be considered, viz., the monument,
and the sepulture or burial of the dead. The burial of the cadaver that is
caro data vermibus (flesh given to worms) is nul~ius in bonis, and belongs
to ecclesiastical congizance; but as to the monument action is given, as hath
been said, at the common law, for the defacing thereof."
The old English doctrine that the executor has the right to the custody
and possession of the dead until after burial does not obtain in the United
States. 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 837 (1898); Doxtator v. Chicago & W. M. R.
Co., 120 Mich. 596, 79 N. W. 922 (1899).
31 15 Am. Jur. 839 (1938).
32 Id., Sec. 6, p. 831, citing:
Foster v. Dodd, 3 Q. B. 67, 77 (1867).
"The person having charge of a body cannot be considered the owner of
it; he holds it only as a trust for the benefit of those who may from family
relationship or friendship have an interest in it."
Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R. I. 227, 14 Am. Rep. 667 (1872).
"The early common law of England recognized no property rights in the
body of a deceased person, this being due, undoubtedly, to the fact that
the Ecclesiastical Courts exercised jurisdiction over the affairs of the
decedents."
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the disposition of the body and has, along with the courts of the
United States, refused to identify any property interest per se in
a dead body.
Likewise, in the English common law, the person who took
charge of the body after death was not considered the owner of
it but he held the body only in trust for the benefit of those who
may from family relationship or friendship have an interest in it.
Once the body was committed to the ground, the dead body was
held to become part of the ground to which it was committed.
From these basic concepts concerning the dead body, the Ameri-
can courts in the very early cases adopted the trust concept
which later developed into the present laws concerning rights to
the dead body. In the very early cases, dealing with the problem,
at least one court held that there can be no property right in a
dead body in the commercial sense. However, this same court
held that there is a quasi-property right in dead bodies vesting
in the nearest relatives of the deceased and arising out of their
duty to bury their dead.3 3 This right, which corresponds in ex-
tent to the duty out of which it arises, includes the right to pos-
session and custody of the body for burial, the right to have it
remain in its final resting place so that the memory of the de-
ceased may receive the respect of the living, or to remove the
body to a proper place and the right to maintain an action, and
recover damages for any outrage, indignity, or injury to the body
of the deceased. Likewise in the American law, the only action
that can be brought for disinterring the body is an action in tres-
pass quare clausum. 3 4 In one of the earliest American cases con-
33 Id., Sec. 6, p. 831, citing:
O'Donnell v. Slack. 123 Cal. 285, 55 P. 906. 43 L. R. A. 388 (1899); Orr
v. Dayton and M. Traction Co., 178 Ind. 40, 96 N. E. 462, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.)
474 (1911);
But also,
For the very reason that no individual is permitted to have any rights
in the body, courts of equity have taken jurisdiction to control the disposi-
tion of the corpse; yet, even these cases do not go on the principle of aiding
the relatives, but are based on the right of burial as a right of the deceased.
Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, supra n. 32; Secor v. Secor, 18 Abb. N.
C. (n. r. 1870); Thompson v. Deeds, 93 Iowa 228, 61 N.W. 842 (1895); Griffith
v. Charlotte C. & A. R. Co., 23 S. C. 25, 55 Am. Rep. 1 (1884); Weld v.
Walker, 130 Mass. 422, 39 Am. Rep. 465 (1881).
34 Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281 (1868).
"While it may be true that a dead body is not property in the common
commercial sense .... it is universally held that those who are entitled to
the possession and custody for purposes of burial have legal rights to and
in it which the law recognizes and will protect."
Sept., 1965
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cerning the interest of the relatives in the remains of their de-
ceased, the New York Court held " . . . that neither the corpse,
nor its burial, was legally subject to ecclesiastic cognizance; that
the right to bury a corpse and to preserve it remains a legal
right." 35
Later American cases have held that there is a qualifted
property right in the dead, giving to someone the control to in-
sure protection of the corpse, decent burial, and continuing re-
pose. 36 However, the majority of opinion and the modern view
upon this question holds that there are no property rights in dead
bodies.37 Any action for mutilation of the dead body, for dis-
35 In re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Brad. 503 (N. Y., 1857).
36 Griffith v. Charlotte R. Co., supra n. 33.
"But can there not be a qualified property in the dead? One which gives
control to someone with the view to protection, to decent interment, and to
understood repose, while they are dissolving and returning to the dust from
which they were created? Can it be that there is no legal guardianship of
the dead? and that when the life escapes the body is left, so far as the law
is concerned, without protection, even from wanton and malicious depreda-
tion, and that those to whom it was bound in life by the tenderest of ties
can invoke the aid of no court in preventing its mutilation? and must they
resort to violence and force for this purpose? If such be the fact, it is a re-
proach to our judicial system, and one which calls earnestly for legislative
interposition. And yet, such seems to be the fact; at least the matter is left
in great doubt, so far as our limited examination of the cases both in this
country and in England, amid the press of our duties, has enabled us to
ascertain."
37 Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, supra n. 32.
"That there is no property right in a dead body, using the word in its
ordinary sense, may well be admitted. Yet, the burial of the dead is a sub-ject which interests the feelings of mankind to a much greater degree than
many matters of actual property. There is a duty imposed by the universal
feelings of mankind to be discharged by someone towards the dead; a duty,
and we may also say a right, to protect from violation; and a duty on the
parts of others to abstain from violation; it may therefore be considered as
a sort of quasi-property."
Beauliu v. Great Northern R. Co., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907).
"The rule laid down in the Larson case (infra) expresses the modern
view of the question, and extends a remedy where otherwise none would
exist. There was no property in the dead bodies, and wronged complained
of being only the invasion of an intangible legal right, no actual damages
for the wrongful mutilation of the body can be recovered, and the courts
award solatium for the bereavement of the next of kin as the only appro-
priate relief. Without the element of mental distress, the action would be
imprudent of results, and of no significance or value as a remedy for the
tortious violation of the legal right of possession and preservation. 7 Cur-
rent Law 954. But that rule can, on principle, have no application to ac-
tions for breach of contract. The breach of contract involves only such con-
sequences as directly result therefrom, and were within the contemplation
of the parties when the contract was made, and which may be measured
and determined by some definite rule or standard of compensation . . .the
complaint before as charges, at most, a negligent failure to perform the con-
(Continued on next page)
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interment, or other wrongs, refers only to the invasion of an
intangible legal right vested in the spouse or next of kin. No
actual damages for the wrongful mutilation of the body can be
recovered. The courts award solatium for the bereavement of
the next of kin as the only appropriate relief.
38
In the elaboration of the basic concept of the American
courts, which state that there is no property right in a dead body,
it must be emphasized that the word property is not used in its
ordinary commercial sense. Nonetheless, there is a duty im-
posed by the universal feelings of mankind upon anyone toward
his dead. This duty, which is also a right, is to protect his dead.
It was in this sense, therefore, that the term quasi-property
evolved.
Although, as we have said, the body is not property in the
usually recognized sense of the word, yet we may consider
it as sort of quasi-property, to which certain persons may
have rights, as they have duties to perform toward it arising
out of our common humanity. But the person having charge
of it cannot be considered as owner of it in any sense what-
soever; he holds it only as a sacred trust for the benefit of
all who may from family or friendship have an interest in
its period.8 9
In summary, the early English common law in fact has been
overruled by the modern American courts to the extent that
there is an interest in the dead body vesting in the relatives or
in the next of kin which can be protected by an action at law.
(Continued from preceding page)
tract, for the breach of which damages for mental anguish are demanded,
and the case is not brought within those wherein such damages are award-
ed for the malicious and wanton breach, to which we have adverted."
But also,
The right to require proper burial belongs to the public, to be exer-
cised for the benefit of the deceased.
Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891), may be considered
as the leading case on the subject, and it has been cited as the basis for
most of the later decisions. The action was for the unlawful mutilation and
dissection of the body of the plaintiff's deceased husband. The only damages
alleged were mental suffering and nervous shock. The court said, in over-
ruling a demurrer to the complaint: "Whatever the act complained of con-
stitutes a violation of some legal right of the plaintiff, which always, in con-
templation of law, causes injury, he is entitled to recover all damages which
are the proximate and natural consequence of the wrongful act. That men-
tal suffering and injury to the feelings would be ordinarily, the natural and
proximate result of knowledge that the remains of a deceased husband had
been mutilated, is too plain to admit of argument."
38 Id., see:
Pierce v. Swanson Cemetery, sup'ra n. 32.
39 Id.
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The dogma of the English Ecclesiastical law, that a child has
no such claim (sacred and inherent right to custody of
corpse in order to decently bury), no such exclusive power,
no peculiar interest in the dead body of its parents, is so
utterly inconsistent with every enlightened perception of
personal right, so inexpressively repulsive to every proper
moral sense, that its adoption would be an eternal disgrace
to American jurisprudence.40
A legal right to bury a corpse, which the courts will protect,
vests in the nearest relative of the decedent so situated as to be
able and willing to perform that duty.
41
Burial Right
In England, the common law exercised no control over the
burial of the deceased persons. The ecclesiastical courts had
jurisdiction over such matters. There being no such dichotomy
of the courts within American jurisdictions, they have held that
this doctrine of no property interest in the body should be con-
verted to rights of the survivors, or the next of kin, in the de-
ceased person. This right includes the right that the body be
decently interred, that the last resting place be uninterfered
with, and that the body be protected.
42
The concept of the right of burial and the right to possession
of the dead body is not original with the American courts. By
the civil law of ancient Rome, the charge for the burial of the
dead body rested first upon the person to whom it was delegated
by the deceased. The person next in order was the scriptia
haeredes (legatees and devisees). In the event that the first two
provisions would not apply, then the charge for the burial of the
dead body rested upon the haeredities legitimi or cognati (heirs)
in order.43 The prevailing view in the United States is that al-
40 Supra, n. 15;
In re Widening of Beekman St., supra n. 35.
41 Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N.W. 40 (1905).
42 Osteen v. Southern R. Co., 101 S.C. 532, 86 S.E. 30 (1915).
"... it is to be remembered that the common law of England had noth-
ing to do with the burial of deceased persons, et cetera, but that the eccle-
siastical court has jurisdiction over such matters and not the courts of com-
mon law; this court will not commit itself to such a barbarous and savage
doctrine as to hold that when a person dies no one has such a property
interest in the body as to see the body is decently interred, and resting
place uninterfered with, and a relative or friend has a right to see that the
body is protected, and these feelings in relation thereto protected."
43 15 Am. Jur. 827 (1938).
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though there is no property right in the commercial sense, there
are certain rights vesting in the nearest relative of the deceased.
These rights arise out of the duty of the relatives to bury their
dead. It includes the right to possession and custody of the body
for burial, and the right to maintain an action to recover dam-
ages for any indignity or injury done to the corpse.44
It has already been stated that a living person by testamen-
tary device may provide for the disposition of his dead body.
This right is limited to only a few jurisdictions and is statutory
in origin. In the absence of testamentary disposition and in re-
gions where testamentary disposition is not available, the sur-
viving spouse or the next of kin has the right to the possession
of the body of the deceased person for the purpose of burial or
other lawful disposition. 45 Accordingly, it would seem that, at
common law, a person may not make an agreement for disposal
of his body after death in such a manner as to violate the right
of his spouse or relatives to bury the body. In fact, it is now the
prevailing rule in England, as well as in America, that the right
to bury the dead and to preserve the remains is a right the in-
fringement of which may be redressed by an action in damages.46
The question often arises, "Who possesses the right to
bury?" In a review of the cases involving the order of rights to
44 17 ALR 2d 771 (1951).
"Originally, the English common law recognized no property rights in a
dead body, the reason being that the ecclesiastical court had jurisdiction
over the decedent's affairs. However, the prevailing view in this country is
that, although there is no property right in a commercial sense, there is a
quasi-property right vesting in the nearest relative of the deceased. This
right, which arose out of the duty of relatives to bury their dead, includes
the right to possession and custody of the body for burial, and the right to
maintain an action to recover damages for any indignity or injury done to
the corpse."
"In the absence of testamentary disposition to the contrary, a surviving
spouse or next of kin has the right to possession of the body of a deceased
person for the purpose of burial or other lawful disposition, Kirksey v.
Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188, 17 ALR 2d 766 (Fla. 1950)."
"It is now the prevailing rule in England as well as in this country that
the right to bury the dead and preserve the remains is a quasi right in
property, the infringement of which may be redressed by an action in dam-
ages. Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Company, 117 N.J.L. 90, 186 A. 585
(1936)."
"The law recognizes a right somewhat akin to property, arising out of
the duty of the nearest relatives to bury their dead, which authorizes and
requires them to take possession of the dead body for the purpose of burial."
Nichols v. Central Vermont RR., 94 Vt. 14, 109 A. 905 (1919).
45 Wood v. Butterworth, 65 Wash. 344, 18 P. 212 (1911).
46 Supra, n. 24.
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burial, as a rule of thumb, the following order should be ob-
served: 1) the decedent's wish, 2) the surviving spouse, and 3)
the next of kin.47 In the United States, burial ordinarily takes
place before the appointment of a personal representative. There-
fore, the duty of burial devolves upon persons in close relation-
ship with the decedent. Most persons look forward to a proper
disposition of their remains, and it is natural that they should
feel anxiety concerning the subject. It has been said that a de-
cent burial is a part of man's own rights, and the right to burial
is well guarded by the law. However, the administrator of an
estate may not bring any action for violation of this right. There
is no doubt that a surviving spouse has the right to the disposi-
tion of the remains of the deceased spouse. And he has the sole
right to bring an action for an invasion of these rights, such as
an unauthorized autopsy or for mutilation of the body.4 How-
ever, the right of the surviving spouse must be properly asserted
or the right to possession of the body for the purposes of inter-
ment will be held to have been waived in favor of the next of
kin.49 As one court stated ". . . in the absence of a testamentary
direction, is it not better that the husband should bury the wife,
and the wife the husband, than that the door should be opened
to an unseemly contest between surviving parent and the next
of kin?" 50
47 Supra, n. 25; also see,
Gould v. State, 181 Misc. 887, 46 NYS 2d 313 (1944).
48 Foley v. Phelps, 1 App. Div. 551, 37 N.Y.S. 471 (1896).
The weight of modern American authority, however, is probably to the
effect that the primary right of custody of the body and control of burial is
not in the personal representative, but in the surviving spouse or next of
kin, unless the decedent left a will containing directions as to his burial, in
which case the executor might derive authority from the will. Enos vs.
Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 P. 170 (1900).
This surviving spouse has the right to select the place of burial of the
deceased spouse, in the absence of a testamentary disposition of the body;
but the last wish of the deceased, if known, is to be considered. Once bur-
ied with the acquiescence of the surviving spouse, a removal should not be
allowed except for cogent reasons; if such reasons are made to appear, how-
ever, the surviving spouse has the right of the selection of the place of re-
interment, and the last known wish of the deceased is also to be considered.
Sacred Heart of Jesus Church v. Soklowski, 159 Minn. 331, 199 N.W. 81
(1924).
49 In the case of a dead body needing burial, the right of the spouse must
be promptly asserted, or the right to possession of the body for the purposes
of interment will be held to have been waived in favor of the next of kin.
Southern Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21 Ala. App. 5, 105 So. 161
(1925).
50 Secor v. Secor, supra n. 33.
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In the event that the dead body is that of a child, the right
of burial is vested in the parents of the child.5 ' There are cases,
however, that hold that the father's right to possession of the
dead body of his child is superior to all others including the
mother of the child. In the latter instance, the court held that
the mother could not maintain the suit, either alone, or jointly,
regardless of how acute her suffering might be. The father had
the duty to support, educate, and maintain the child, and had the
right to sue for interference with the right to provide decent
interment.5 2 However, in most jurisdictions, the consent of both
the mother and the father is necessary for the performance of an
autopsy on the body of their child.53
In cases where there is no spouse or there is no surviving
parent of a minor child, the right to burial devolves upon the
next of kin who are present and acting.54 Thus the children of
the deceased person, or brothers and sisters of the deceased per-
son may have the right to burial of the body.
Permission for Autopsy
An autopsy is a postmortem examination of the body of the
deceased for the purpose of scientific interest in determining the
cause of death and other information that may be obtained that
might aid medical science. Yet an autopsy may not be performed
upon every person who dies. While the old English law knew no
civil action for the mutilation of the body of a dead person, such
a right of action is recognized in the United States. The basis of
such an action is predicated upon the right to burial of the body.
51 Coty v. Baughman, 50 S. D. 372, 210 N.W. 348 (1926); Burney v. Chil-
dren's Hospital, 169 Mass. 57, 47 N.E. 401 (1897).
52 Stephenson v. Duke University, 202 N.C. 624, 163 S.E. 698 (1932).
53 Coty v. Baughman, supra n. 51.
"The concern of both the father and mother is necessary to the perform-
ance of an autopsy on the body of their child where they are living together
and both are within the state."
54 Where the wife is not living with her husband at the time of his death
or neglects or refuses to assume the trust incident to her right, a waiver of
that right is implied and the right and duty immediately descends to the
next of kin present and acting. Southern Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Mor-
gan, 21 Ala. App. 5, 105 So. 161, supra n. 49.
The wrongful invasion of a clear right is of itself sufficient to support an
action, and the law presumes damages though they may be only nominal.
Larson v. Chase, supra n. 36; Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, supra n. 32;
Lussen v. Oshkosh Electric Light Co., 109 Wis. 94, 98, 85 N.W. 124 (1901);
Hacker v. Heiney, 111 Wis. 313, 87 N.W. 249 (1901); Luby v. Bennett, 111
Wis. 613, 87 N.W. 804 (1901).
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It is considered that the right to possession of the body for the
purpose of burial is the right to possession of the body intact."
Therefore, with the exception of statutory provisions to the con-
trary, or certain other exceptions based upon contract, the per-
son who has the right to bury, possesses the right to grant an
autopsy. An autopsy or postmortem examination may be per-
formed upon the body of a deceased person whenever the writ-
ten consent thereto has been obtained.
An autopsy or postmortem examination may be performed
upon the body of a deceased person whenever the written con-
sent thereto has been obtained in any of the following ways:
1) by written authorization signed by the deceased during
his lifetime.
2) by written consent of any party whom the deceased dur-
ing his lifetime designated by written instrument to take
charge of his body for burial.
3) by consent of the decedent's surviving spouse.
4) When surviving spouse is incompetent, unavailable, or
does not claim the body for burial, or when there is no
spouse, by consent of any adult child, parent, brother, or
sister of the decedent. The consent of any one of such
persons shall be sufficient provided that such autopsy
shall not be performed under a consent given by one of
such persons if, before such autopsy is performed, any of
said others shall object in writing to the physician or the
surgeon by whom the autopsy is to be performed.
5) When none of the above-named persons is available to
claim the body, then the consent of any other relative or
friend who assumes custody of the body for burial. Such
antemortem consent or postmortem consent for an au-
topsy probably is effective evidence in the absence of
statute.56
Unfortunately, permission to perform autopsy does not in-
clude the removal of organs. An autopsy consent is usually for
an examination in the approved and usual manner practiced by
the medical profession. (See Autopsy Consent Form-Figure 3.)
If it is necessary to remove organs for microscopic examination,
and if such organs are replaced and buried with the body, then
there can be no liability for going beyond the extent of the per-
mission for autopsy!
55 15 Am. Jur. 847 (1938).
56 159 J.A.M.A. 487 (1955).
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Insurance policies frequently contain provisions giving the
insurance carrier the right to make an autopsy on the body of
the insured in order to determine the cause of death. The pro-
priety, necessity, and validity of these autopsy provisions have
been recognized by the courts. The provision is reasonable and
quite necessary in accident insurance as affording protection
against frauds. However, the courts have put limitations on the
exercise of the privilege by the insurer. For example, the in-
surer must demand an autopsy within a reasonable time after
the death of the insured.57
In many states there are statutory provisions whereby the
coroner in certain instances may order an autopsy upon the body
of a dead person.5" In most instances such an autopsy may be
carried out without the consent of the surviving spouse or the
next of kin when the circumstances are such as to cause a rea-
sonable suspicion that the death may have resulted from some
unlawful means. The intent of such laws is to permit a coroner
to use an autopsy only as a supplemental means to determine
whether the cause of death was by other than natural means. In
most instances this is defined as being within the discretion of
the coroner. Occasionally a court may find that the evidence
shows an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.59 Where a
coroner does authorize an autopsy wrongfully, he may be held
liable for damages. This is in effect an invasion of the right of
the body to burial. The physician performing an autopsy must
be able to show that consent was received from the person en-
57 30 ALR 2d 838: Insurance, Time of Autopsy.
58 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 313.13 (Autopsy).
59 Brown v. Broome County, 8 N.Y. 2d 330, 207 N.Y.S. 2d 657, 170 N.E. 2d
666 (1960).
"Occasionally a court may find that the evidence shows an abuse of dis-
cretion as a matter of law, but such instances are rare. There are, however,
many cases, and this is one, where the question of reasonableness of the
grounds for directing an autopsy may not be found to be absolutely right or
wrong. It falls in an area where there is a want of full proof. Then the
question of reasonableness cannot be treated as a problem of law alone.
When, as here, the nature of the work, the duties of the deceased, the site
of the work and the scene of death disclose conditions which often accom-
pany accidents resulting in death, there should be substantial reasons pres-
ent to justify the need for an autopsy. Since the death was unwitnessed
and could have been caused by the injury to the hand, an autopsy would
not lead to signs of criminality or point to suicide. When these facts are
considered collectively, the judgment used by the coroner cannot be found
to be unassailable. In such circumstances an appraisal of the sensibleness
of a decision directing an autopsy does involve a finding of the fact."
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titled to possession or disposition of the body, or that he acted
under proper authority of the coroner.60
Unauthorized Autopsy
The old law knew no civil action for the mutilation of the
body of a dead person. However, such a right is recognized in
the United States, and is based upon the right of burial. It is
now considered that the right to the possession of the body for
the purpose of burial is a right to the possession of the body in-
tact.61 It is difficult to perceive how a living person can suffer
legally recognizable damages for an act of mutilation upon a
corpse. Nevertheless, the nearly unanimous opinions of the
courts is that a cause of action does exist for an unauthorized
autopsy. The basis of recovery is found in the personal right of
the deceased's next of kin to bury the body, rather than any
property right in it. An autopsy is said to be an interference with
this right because the act of dissecting the body prevents burial
in a proper manner. In most cases, the courts apparently as-
sumed that any cutting of the corpse, however slight, will inter-
fere with the right to give it a proper burial, and do not discuss
the problems concerning the particular degree of mutilation that
results from an autopsy.6 2 The personal right to bury a body is
corollary to the duty to bury, which, in the United States, falls
on the person who is closest in relationship to the deceased. Con-
sequently, the general rule is that only the person who is near-
est to the deceased may recover damages for an unauthorized
autopsy, regardless of how severe the injury to the other loved
one might be.63 Since a tort of this type rarely involves any pe-
60 83 ALR 2d 956 (1962); Hirko v. Ruse, 351 Pa. 238, 40 A. 2d 408 (1945).
61 Supra n. 11.
62 Farly v. Carson, 8 Ohio Dec. Repr. 119 (1880); Medical College v. Rush-
ing, 1 Ga. App. 468, 57 S.E. 1083 (1907); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Blackmon,
3 Ga. App. 80, 59 S.E. 341 (1907).
But also the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered by the defendant's
fault does not entitle him to damages; an action at law may be maintained
only if the injury be actionable on some clear common-law principle.
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 443 (1902);
Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899).
63 Although several different people might conceivably suffer mental an-
guish to some extent by a performance of an autopsy on the body of a de-
ceased relative, the law has generally recognized that the primary right to
recover is in the surviving spouse of the decedent. Since the spouse is usu-
(Continued on next page)
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cuniary or physical injury, the generally recognized basis of dam-
ages is mental suffering. Since the wrong committed is, by its
nature, intentional rather than negligent, the courts have also
permitted punitive damages to be assessed. However, there are
cases in which damages were not permitted, wherein the muti-
lation of the body consisted of an incision in the abdomen which
was sewn up and covered with adhesive plaster.64 Likewise,
when permission is granted, an autopsy may not be performed
beyond the limits of the autopsy and must be done in the usual
and customary manner. 5 Generally, the degree or the extent of
mutilation does not seem to be an element of the cause of action.
Most courts apparently assume that any unauthorized cutting
will render the body unfit for burial. However, there are cases
that suggest that there can be no recovery unless some substan-
tial mutilation is shown.
When an autopsy has been performed without proper au-
thorization, the courts do consider this to be a mutilation of the
body. There are, however, the exceptions whereby the state by
virtue of the doctrine of charitable or sovereign immunity has
prevented recovery for an unauthorized autopsy.66
(Continued from preceding page)
ally accorded the right of disposition over the remains and has the author-
ity to grant or deny permission to perform an autopsy.
U. S.-Aetna Life Insurance Com. v. Lindsay, 69 F. 2d 627 (7th Cir.
1934); Gould v. State, supra n. 47.
64 Farly v. Carson, supra n. 62.
The plaintiff failed to prove her case alleging willful desecration and
mutilation of the body of her husband where her only evidence was that
a four to eight inch incision had been made on the abdomen, sewn up, and
covered with adhesive plaster and there was no mutilation or dismember-
ment, so that the body was left fit for burial.
65 Coty v. Baughman, supra n. 51.
"We think that where, as in this case, the wrongful act constituted an
infringement of a legal right, mental suffering may be recovered for, if it is
the direct, proximate, and natural result of, the wrongful act. The coroner
having no right to perform the autopsy in this case, it was immaterial
whether or not the autopsy was performed in a skillful manner."
Palenzke v. Bruning, 98 Ill. App. 644 (1900).
"... even if sufficient reason for an autopsy did exist no one had the
right to hack open the body, remove the brain, liver, and spleen, and, in the
presence of friends and relatives, throw the organs into a privy or water
closet, since such conduct violated every instinct of propriety and was cer-
tain to outrage the feelings of the kindred of the deceased."
66 Lane v. Knoxville, 170 Tenn. 482, 96 S.W. 2d 769 (1936); Schwabb v.
Connely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P. 2d 667 (1947).
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Damages
The usual basis of damages in an action for unauthorized
autopsy is mental distress, notwithstanding the traditional re-
luctance of the common law to award damages for mental an-
guish without any accompanying physical injury.6 7 However,
many courts hold that where the act is characterized as willful,
wanton, or malicious, or one committed with an intention to
cause mental distress, damages can be recovered.
In one instance it was claimed that the removal of certain
organs and part of the bony structure of the body of the plain-
tiff's husband, and retention of these parts caused it to be im-
possible to embalm the body.68 The defendants were held liable
for exceeding their authority in performing the autopsy. How-
ever, the court held that retention of portions of the body could
only support a claim for nominal damages.
Under the general rule, there can be no recovery of damages
for mental suffering or anguish where no physical injury is in-
flicted and no pecuniary loss sustained. Recovery of damages for
mental distress has been denied in many actions relating to dead
bodies. But as a general rule, a person who has a qualified prop-
erty right in the dead body for the purpose of securing its burial
is entitled to recover damages for the mental anguish caused by
the willful and wanton mutilation of the body. Damages for
mental anguish may be recovered for indignities inflicted upon
a dead body other than the mutilation thereof, at least when
they are willful and not caused by mere negligence.69
Removal of Organs
The English common law and the case law of the United
States reveals that, in general, and in the absence of statutory
67 Larsen v. Chase, supra n. 36.
68 Gray v. Southern Pac. Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 240, 68 P. 2d 1011 (1937).
69 15 Am. Jur. 827 (1938).
Mental anguish is an element of damage for mutilation or negligent
handling of dead bodies. See,
42 Ill. Law R. 393-394 (1947); Nichols v. Central Vermont R.R., supra
n. 45:
"The current of authority undoubtedly supports the doctrine that, in the
absence of a statute, in ordinary action for negligence there can be no re-
covery for mental suffering where there is no attendant physical injury.
Such is the long and more recognized rule of the common law; the deci-
sions to this effect resting upon the elementary principle that mere mental
pain and anxiety are too vague for legal redress, where no injury is done
to the person, property, health, or reputation."
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provision, permission for the removal of organs from the dead
body must be granted by the person or persons who have the
right of burial. (See Consent Form for Transplantation-Figure
4.) The right to remove organs for the purposes of transplanta-
tion into another person, therefore, depends upon the consent for
the removal of such organs by the person who possesses the right
of burial. However, to be of any value, vital organs such as the
kidneys and the liver must be preserved from exposure to the
hypoxia. This necessitates a removal of the organs immediately
after death. Otherwise, these organs would be of little, if any,
value to the living recipient.
Definition of Death
There are many situations in the practice of medicine where
death is known to all concerned to be inevitable. Yet, for pur-
poses of transplantation, organs removed from these bodies im-
mediately after death might well be suitable for transplantation.
Should the person who has the right to burial grant permis-
sion to remove the organs at death from the patient (who is dy-
ing), the question arises, "At what moment does death occur?"
Death is defined in Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary,
24th Edition, as "The apparent extinction of life, as manifested
by the absence of heartbeat and respiration." A physician may
rely on various tests or signs to determine whether or not death
has occurred. Such tests are undertaken to prove that the heart
has stopped beating, that respiration has ceased, and that circu-
lation and responses of the vascular system to certain stimuli
have been irreversibly altered. To determine whether or not
death has occurred, the physician first determines whether cir-
culation of the blood has ceased. He does this simply by placing
a stethoscope over the heart and listening to the heartbeat. He
also attempts to determine whether or not there is any heartbeat
by feeling for the pulse which, through palpitation of the arteries
also indicates whether or not the heart has stopped beating.
The lack of a heartbeat may also be determined by fluoroscopic
examination or by electrocardiogram, where such facilities are
available.
The cessation of respiration may be determined by various
methods, the oldest and the best known being that of placing a
mirror before the nose and the mouth. If the mirror fogs, it
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shows that respiration has not ceased. Similarly, a light article
such as a feather may be placed before the nose and the mouth.
The lack of movement indicates cessation of respiration.70
It is common knowledge in medical centers that such defini-
tions of death are obsolete. It is not possible to define death only
as the cessation of respiration or of the heartbeat. These two
functions may be carried on now by artificial means. For in-
stance, the heartbeat may be stimulated by an electric pacemaker
(an instrument that is in common use in the large medical cen-
ters), or the circulation may be maintained by forceful massage
of the heart. Likewise, a patient need not die because he is un-
able to breathe. There are many instruments now available in
most hospitals to ventilate the patient artificially. As an illustra-
tion, the patient who suffers a massive brain hemorrhage fre-
quently becomes apneic (unable to breathe). Should this patient
be ventilated by an automatic respirator, life will continue for
a considerable length of time. The heart and circulation gener-
ally are not grossly affected by this massive "stroke." However,
the destruction of the brain by the hemorrhage may not be con-
sistent with prolonged or productive life. The question then
arises, "Is this patient dead?" So long as his respirations are
artificially continued and his circulation is maintained, "life" will
continue. However, this patient, if abandoned, will not survive.
In fact, if the artificial respirator is stopped, the heart and the
circulation will also stop within a very few minutes. The patient
has had irreversible destruction of brain matter and is not now
salvageable. He has no hope of ever regaining consciousness.
His existence depends wholly upon artificial means, and it is
questionable how long such artificial means will be effective.
By contrast, consider the patient suffering from a paralytic
poliomyelitis. As the result of the disease, the patient may have
extreme difficulty in breathing or may not be able to breathe at
all. During the great poliomyelitis epidemics of the not-too-
distant past, many patients were supported by artificial respira-
tors and many of them continue to live today by this means.
Those who are living and have not regained their respiratory
power would die immediately should their respirator be discon-
tinued. Therefore, the fact that life can only be maintained by
mechanical instruments is not sufficient to establish death. Like-
70 4 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts 4 (1960).
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wise, the heart that has stopped as a result of an acute coronary
occlusion or from other causes might be stimulated by artificial
electric means. In this way, the heart may continue to beat or
the circulation be maintained by external cardiac massage. With
these illustrations, it becomes evident that death is no longer de-
termined by the lack of respiration or the lack of a heartbeat or
the lack of circulation. Death is determined by several factors
but primarily by the state of unconsciousness. When the chances
of recovery of consciousness have been totally eliminated, brain
death has occurred.
Death is unique. It is unlike aught else in its certainty and
its incidents. A corpse in some respects is the strangest thing
on earth. A man who but yesterday breathed, and thought,
and walked among us has passed away. Something has gone.
The body is left still and cold, and is all that is visible to the
mortal eye of the man we knew .... 71
But the lack of function of the mind alone is insufficient as
evidence of death. It is generally conceded that some conscious
persons live on while breathing with mechanical assistance. The
question then is, "When is the brain so damaged that conscious-
ness cannot be regained?" Medicine and the law then must de-
fine the moment of death and must define it upon medical prin-
ciples that have been well established. No longer is it adequate
to talk about the cessation of respiration and to talk about ces-
sation of circulation as the moment of death. It would be a most
unrealistic position to require a physician to support a patient by
artificial means when all chances and hope of recovery are gone.
The definition of death must fit within the modern concept of life
as it is defined by the physiologist. With the advent of the era of
transplantation of organs, medicine and humanity can no longer
afford the luxury of condemning to the grave the vital organs,
which if transplanted into another person, can preserve that per-
son's life. The law also must protect the physician by setting
down the ground rules under which the science of transplanta-
tion may progress, and yet preserve unto the dying the basic
rights of humanity.
Through public education, many people now in anticipation
of death, request that their organs, if suitable, be taken for pur-
poses of transplantation. Likewise, many others closely related
71 See, 16 Am. Jur. 16 (1938).
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to the dying person have granted permission that the organs be
taken as soon as death has occurred. The questions now are,
"When must all hope be abandoned for saving the patient? When
all hope is abandoned can supportive therapy be withdrawn?
When all support is withdrawn, when is the moment of death?"
Ultimately, the decision must rest with the patient's physician.
Some authorities have recommended that an electroencephalo-
gram be taken of the dying patient in whom irreversible changes
in the brain have been thought to have occurred.
When death occurs, or in the alternative, when death has
been declared inevitable, the circulation and the respiration may
be maintained by artificial means. This would afford the time
that the surgeon requires to transport the body of the deceased
person to the operating room and under sterile conditions remove
the organs required for transplantation.
Recently, physicians from the Karolinska Institute received
international attention when they removed a kidney from a 40-
year-old dying woman and transplanted it into the recipient.
The donor had suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and was brought
into the neurosurgical clinic in a comatose condition. Her con-
dition had been pronounced hopeless. While she could not, her-
self, be asked to consent to the removal of the kidney, the oper-
ation was performed with her husband's approval. She died in
a respirator two days after operation. Professor Craaford de-
fended the action and the principle. He said that he and his staff
had previously agreed that in cases in which irreparable damage
to the central nervous system had occurred, and in which the
prognosis with 100 per cent certainty be deemed hopeless, the
possibility could be considered of removing a kidney for trans-
plantation before what is currently interpreted as "death" had
occurred. It was his opinion that if the physician were to wait
until death, in the conventional sense, the possibility of a suc-
cessful transplantation would have decreased tremendously. The
position taken by the Swedish physicians is based upon a liberal
interpretation of the definition of death. In their particular case,
neither respiration nor circulation had ceased and the patient
was not, according to the information at hand, dependent upon
either of these mechanical means for support. The brain may
have been irreversibly damaged, although neither respiration
nor circulation had failed.
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The Swedish case has been criticized from both the legal as
well as moral and ethical points of view. The very thought of
human experimentation brings to mind the tales of horror from
Germany under the Third Reich. Therefore, it will become prac-
tically impossible to have legislatures of the various States pass
legislation that will grant to a single person or to a group of per-
sons the right to determine when death has occurred, unless and
until there are more positive signs of irreversible damage. At
present only when it is absolutely certain, as judged by the pa-
tient's physician and any consultants he may choose, that sur-
vival is impossible and death imminent, may permission for re-
moval of organs for transplantation be requested. Much of this
burden would be eased if, in the future, people would have the
right to request by testamentary device that their organs be re-
moved for transplantation in the event of their sudden death.
Summary
Medical science has now made it possible to transplant kid-
neys from one individual to another in order to save the lives of
patients dying of kidney failure. The use of kidneys from recent-
ly deceased patients (so called cadaver donors) is increasing, cre-
ating special legal problems in regard to obtaining and using such
organs. As techniques of heart, lung, and liver transplantation
develop, these legal problems may become even more complex.
Since the time from death of donor to implantation into re-
cipient vitally affects the success of organ transplantation, and
since permission for organ donation can now come only from the
family of the deceased at or near time of death, a change in exist-
ing statutes appears necessary. A living person should have the
statutory right to bequeath organs of his body for purposes of
transplantation. This right, to be effective, must be superior to
the common law right of burial of the survivors. With the family
informed and in agreement with the prospective donor's wishes
in advance, sudden death of the donor would no longer create the
legal emergency that now often renders successful transplanta-
tion impossible.
Sept., 1965
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FIGURE 1
Live donor permit to transplant kidneys from minors. (Through the
courtesy of Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts.)
-------------------- HOSPITAL
Request for Kidney Transplant Operation
in Release of All Claims
Whereas ------------------- born on ---------- and residing
on ---------------------------------------- has a serious
kidney ailment and is in danger of losing --- life unless an oper-
ation is performed on ----- : and whereas certain doctors con-
nected with the --------------------- Hospital are willing to
perform this operation upon the said ------------------ in the
hope of saving the life of the said ---------------------- and
whereas the doctors who propose to perform said operations and
the-------------------- Hospital and its staff of doctors and
medical associates wish to be absolved from any and all liability,
damages, law suits and causes of action as a result of the oper-
ation, now therefore in consideration of the operation to be per-
formed and any further operations which may in the opinion of
those doctors be necessary therewith, we,
and ------------------ the intended recipient of the operation
and the intended donor fully realizing that the operation may be
unsuccessful and may result in either losing their life or in future
physical incapacity, illness or illnesses directly or indirectly
caused by said operation, we nevertheless both jointly and sever-
ally on behalf of ourselves, our heirs, administrators, executors,
and assigns do hereby request that said operation be performed
upon -------------------- and hereby RELEASE AND FOR-
EVER DISCHARGE the ---------------------- Hospital, its
director, and all persons on its medical or surgical staff who are
in any way directly or indirectly connected with said operations
or any other future operations resulting from them, for our post-
operative care while in the ------------------- Hospital, from
all damages or causes of action, either at law or in equity, which
we may have or acquire or which may accrue to us, our heirs,
administrators, executors or assigns as a result of these oper-
ations or medical care arising therefrom. We intend this to be
a complete RELEASE AND DISCHARGE of all persons as well
as any corporate entity having anything to do with the oper-
ations and we intend hereby to RELEASE AND FOREVER
DISCHARGE said persons from all liability whatsoever. It is
clearly understood by all parties to this instrument that no repre-
sentations have been made to any of us regarding the success of
the operations, and we fully understand that said operations are
somewhat in the nature of an experiment and are being per-
formed in the hope of saving the life of the said-------------
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We have read all the statements contained herein and we fully
realize that we are signing a complete release and bar to any
further claims which we may have resulting from these oper-
ations.
DONOR RECIPIENT*
PARENT PARENT
WITNESS
DATE
*Should recipient be a minor, the signature of both parents must
be obtained.
FIGURE 2
Suggested adult live donor consent form.
Permission to Remove Kidney for Transplantation
(Adult Live Donor Form)
Doctor --------------------- has explained to me that the life
of ------------------------ is endangered due to irreversible
kidney disease. It has also been explained to me that a kidney
can be transplanted from one person to another by surgical oper-
ation. The immediate risks to me of the operation for removal of
my kidney, as well as the possible future permanent injury to
my health suffered as a direct result of the removal of my kidney
has been fully explained to me. I am also aware of the possibility
that such kidney transplant might not be successful.
In an effort to benefit ---------------------- , I nevertheless
wish and do request, authorize and direct Doctor
to remove one of my kidneys by means of surgical operation in
order that this kidney may be transplanted into-------------
Date Signature of Donor
This is to certify that the above form was read and signed by the
donor in my presence. Further, it is my opinion that
-understands fully the contemplated procedure, its
risks, and possible consequences.
Witness
Sept., 1965
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FIGURE 3
Autopsy permit (through the courtesy of The Cleveland Clinic Founda-
tion).
CLEVELAND CLINIC HOSPITAL
Cleveland, Ohio
I do hereby grant permission to the authorities of The Cleveland
Clinic Foundation of Cleveland to perform an autopsy on the
body of ----------------------- a deceased patient, with the
object of ascertaining the direct and indirect causes of death,
including such examination of thorax and abdomen, brain, spinal
cord, peripheral nerves, bones and marrow, neck, and organs of
special senses, as may be necessary for this purpose, and to re-
move and retain such parts of the body as may be deemed neces-
sary for study subsequent to the autopsy.*
Witness to signature Signed
Relationship to patient
Address
Approved
Hospital Superintendent
*When permission for examination is limited, draw a line
through each part for which permission for examination is not
given.
FIGURE 4
Suggested authorization form for removal of organs from cadaver.
Authorization to Remove Kidneys for Transplantation
I hereby authorize and direct the surgeons on the staff of ----
------- Hospital to remove, by an abdominal
incision, the kidneys from the body of---------------------
deceased. It is my wish that these kidneys, if suitable, be used
for purposes of transplantation, in order to attempt to preserve
life, health, and well-being.
Signature
Relationship to deceased
Address
Witnesses
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